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Realizing Reason in History: 
How Cunning Does It Have to Be? 
Real Robert Fillion 
The expression, "Realizing Reason in History," has at least two senses, 
both of which Hegel tries to bring out in his philosophy of history. The first 
suggests that there. is reason in history. That is, the task of the philosopher is 
to show how reason has developed itself through history. The second sense 
suggests that, not only does history show us that reason has developed over 
time, but the task of history is precisely to develop or realize reason in time. 
There is reason in history because that is what history brings about. Thus, the 
"realization" of reason in history is both something that is recognized and 
something that must be done. This "realization" is accomplished, willy-nilly, 
through the doings and sufferings of concrete human beings. Hegel wants to 
show that history is not a cold, anonymous process which simply sweeps up 
human lives and never looks back. Indeed, his philosophy of history is 
primarily concerned with the concrete doings and sufferings of human beings, 
and wishes to rescue from meaninglessness all those ephemeral human lives 
which populate the historical process. That, according to Hegel, is what the 
philosophy of history is all about. 
This may come as a surprise to those who, when they think of Hegel, 
especially insofar as history is concerned, think of the "cunning of reason," 
thus conjuring up images of a deceitful, unfeeling Absolute, tricking and using 
innocent human lives in order to accomplish its own ends. There are in fact 
many different places in Hegel where such an image finds ample textual justi­
fication. An obvious example of such a text can be found in the Lectures on 
the Philosophy of World History, where Hegel's eloquence is matched only by 
the seeming repulsiveness of his images - at least for some of us. For exam­
ple, here is one way that Hegel characterizes the historical process: 
Particular interests contend with one another, and some are 
destroyed in the process. But it is from this very conflict and 
destruction of particular things that the universal emerges, and 
it remains unscathed itself. For it is not the universal Idea which 
enters into opposition, conflict, and danger; it keeps itself in the 
background, untouched and unharmed, and sends forth the par­
ticular interests of passion to fight and wear themselves out in 
its ~t~. I~o'~~t"'W~dcall the cunning ofreason ~'!~~~~='L~"._~ ~,,_.Cc ••• _' 
.'~ ,.~"""'~~..~""'.........~ 
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passions to work in its service, so that the agents by which it 
gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer the loss. 
For the latter belong to the phenomenal world, of which part is 
worthless and part is of positive value. The particular is as a 
rule inadequate in relation to the universal, and individuals are 
sacrificed and abandoned as a result. The Idea pays the tribute 
which existence and the transient world exact, but it pays it 
through the passions of individuals rather than out of its own 
1resources.
It is passages like this one which are cited when Hegel is condemned 
for totally obliterating the self-worth of individual human beings, a self-worth 
whose recognition was achieved only after a long struggle. Moreover, it is 
claimed, for all his talk of freedom, Hegel has effectively denied freedom, that 
is, the freedom that counts, the freedom of individual human beings. This is 
what many of us find so repulsive about the kind of characterization of the 
historical process Hegel here seems to be offering us. Leaving aside the 
civilized but more or less empty accusations of its "sheer speculativeness" and 
"unempiricity," what is really at stake is that most of us do not take kindly to 
being regarded as the mere playthings of anything, let alone of some kind of 
mysterious Absolute. We understand ourselves to be free, conscious, responsi­
ble agents, in charge of what we are and what we do. In other words, we view 
ourselves as autonomous (Freud et al. notwithstanding). Because of this, we 
are rather touchy when we read such things as the passage cited above. It 
seems to deny everything we believe ourselves to be. 
Touchiness is fine, of course; it can even denote a certain measure of 
sensitivity. But as well as being sensitive, it is good to be sensible also, and not 
condemn what we have not as yet attempted to understand. The first clue that 
the traditional reaction to Hegel's conception of the "cunning of reason" is 
misguided is the insufficient attention paid to the actual words Hegel uses. In 
the passage cited above, Hegel writes that it is what we may call the cunning 
of reason that ... Some commentators have pointed out that this way of 
phrasing the matter suggests that the idea of the cunning of reason serves 
merely as an illustration of the point Hegel is trying to make, and should not 
be construed as what best characterizes his philosophy of history," In many 
ways Hegel's philosophy would make more sense if it did not have this image 
of the cunning of reason included in it. At least his views would then be seen 
to mesh more harmoniously with our own traditional self-image (which in 
large part stems from the Enlightenment). 
Although overemphasizing the image of the cunning of reason distorts 
what Hegel says, leaving it completely out of the picture is just as distortive, if 
not more so. We have to come to terms with it. In order to do this we must 
not mix it up with what it is not. Obviously, it bears resemblance to many simi­
lar concepts in the tradition such as Providence, Pre-Established Harmony, 
Fortune, Fate, the Invisible Hand; and, indeed, Hegel is well 'aware of this. 
1. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. by 
H. B. Nisbet with an intro. by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 
p.89. 
2 For example, Denise Souche-Dagues makes this point in her Le code h~/ietl 
(paris: Presses univcrsitaires de France, 1986), p. 148. 
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Since his "cunning of reason" is a member of this family, as it were, of con­
cepts, it shares certain characteristics while possessing its own distinctions. 
The most obvious distinction, of course (although it is rarely pointed 
out), is Hegel's use of the word 'cunning' (List). Its use has no doubt contri­
buted to the abuse heaped upon Hegel, for it connotes deceit and dishonesty. 
But these are by no means its only connotations, nor need they be the most 
important ones. The idea of "cunning" also suggests skill and dexterity, the 
ability to achieve our ends no matter how unlikely or unconducive the condi­
tions may be. It indicates a certain resourcefulness, even if somewhat unscru­
pulously applied. We use "cunning" in order to get around the bruteness and 
undeniable force or strength of that which would otherwise stand in our way. 
The symbol of the idea of "cunning" is the fox, that quick, sharp-witted, snick­
ering creature we often find ourselves cheering on despite ourselves. With 
good reason too, for we, like the fox, must constantly rely on our wits in order 
to survive in what often seems like a hostile environment. 
It is this dimension of the idea of "cunning" which underlies Hegel's 
use of the expression, and it is precisely this dimension which distinguishes 
Hegel's "cunning of reason" from those other somewhat similar concepts such 
as Providence, Fate, etc. mentioned above. Reason is cunning because it 
manages to survive and even flourish in a world rent through and through 
with the unreflective self-centeredness of individual human beings. Not only 
does it survive, it actually uses that self-centeredness as the means by which it 
achieves its own ends. Just what are the ends of reason? Those which human 
beings recognize (upon philosophical reflection) as having been duped into 
accomplishing despite themselves. Herein lies Hegel's genius in using a con­
cept such as the cunning of reason in order to express what was inadequately 
expressed through concepts such as Fate or Providence. The cunning lies 
precisely in that it is recognized (and the difference for Hegel lies precisely in 
this element of recognition), thereby establishing its ends as our own, even 
though we did not notice them. Thus, Hegel's view is actually opposed to any 
view which would make us out as the mere playthings of something outside or 
apart from us. Reason cannot survive outside of us, as it were; therefore, it 
must use considerable skill and dexterity in order to get us to achieve its own 
ends, especially its own self-recognition. Reason has no eyes of its own; it can 
only see itself through ours. 
But before I break into Hegelianese, perhaps this is a good place to 
pause and consider the similarities and dissimilarities which Hegel's concep­
tion of the "cunning of reason," as so far described, has with a conception of 
history proposed by Kant in an essay entitled "Idea for a Universal History 
from a Cosmopolitan Point of View." The two conceptions put forward by 
Kant and Hegel bear a striking resemblance, so much so that a recent critic 
has claimed that, although there is a major and crucial difference between the 
two, it is not so much one of content as of the status of the claims put forward," 
There is obviously much truth to this, as we shall see; however, I do not think 
it goes to the heart of the matter. 
3. Immanuel Kant, On History, ed. by LewisWhite Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1963), pp. 11-26.
4. Luc Ferry, Philosophie politique 2: te systbne des philosophies tie l'histoite (paris: 
Presses universitaires de France, 1986), p. 84. 
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First of all, a major distinction between Kant and Hegel is that Kant's 
conception might be called, as Yovel says, a "cunning of nature" rather than a 
"cunning of reason. lf5 Kant is concerned with history not as the self-unfolding 
of an Absolute, as is Hegel, but as the arena of human activity and develop­
ment. What impresses Kant is that out of such a messy and seemingly hope­
less motley of activities and events, one can still discern a kind of develop­
ment or progression or evolution. Kant writes on p. 12: 
One cannot suppress a certain indignation when one sees men's 
actions on the great world-stage and finds, beside the wisdom 
that appears here and there among individuals, everything in 
the large woven together from folly, childish vanity, even from 
childish malice and destructiveness. In the end, one does not 
know what to think of the human race, so conceited in its gifts. 
Since the philosopher cannot presuppose any [conscious] indivi­
dual purpose among men in their great drama, there is no other 
expedient for him except to try to see if he can discover a natu­
ral purpose in this idiotic course of things human. In keeping 
with this purpose, it might be possible to have a history with a 
definite natural plan for creatures who have no plan of their 
own. 
Kant is not claiming to be offering a description of the actual historical 
process, but instead is putting forward a hypothesis which is ultimately to serve 
a practical purpose. This hypothesis, of course, resembles Hegel's conception 
in that human beings are duped into doing what is good for themselves while 
being motivated by sheer self-interest. This arises out of what Kant calls "the 
unsocial sociability of men, " and his claim is that "the sources of unsociable­
ness and mutual opposition from which so many evils arise, drive men to new 
exertions of their forces and thus to the manifold development of their capaci­
ties" (p. 16). This is an acute and interesting observation. On the basis of it, 
Kant goes on to formulate his hypothesis, stated for example in the "Eighth 
Thesis" of his "Idea for a Universal History," namely, that the "history of 
mankind can be seen, in the large, as the realization of nature's secret plan to 
bring forth a perfectly constituted state as the only condition in which the 
capacities of mankind can be fully developed, and also bring forth that ex­
ternal relation among states which is perfectly adequate to this end" (p. 21). 
Again, it is important to stress that Kant is not making a claim about the 
actual historical process; he is not indulging in a priori history in that sense. 
Essentially, he is proposing a hypothesis whose "proof" lies in the practical 
sphere. For while it might appear "strange and apparently silly to wish to write 
a history in accordance with an Idea of how the course of the world must be if 
it is to lead to certain rational ends" given the fact that "we are too blind to 
see the secret mechanism of its workings, this Idea may still serve as a guiding 
thread for presenting as a system, at least in broad outlines, what would other­
wise be a planless conglomeration of human actions" (p. 24). Thus, Kant is not 
open to the same criticism as Hegel, for his conception of the "cunning of na­
ture" is a regulative idea and makes no ontological claim about the historical 
S. YJrJDishu Yovel, KlInt and thePhilosophyofHistory (Princeton: PrincetonUDivcrsity 
Press, 1980), p. 165. 
, ,c~~.",:.r""":"~_~u:.i:~,,, ".",•• ;.".~.t! Ir (4 !!<--_~ 
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process. The use of the expression is, as Yovel points out, "metaphorical, 
based upon an analogy with human works; but the use of this analogy is indis­
pensable, since we could not otherwise grasp the phenomenon of history as a 
sphere with its own distinctive characteristics" (p. 165). 
One might rightly be impressed by this brief and seductive philosophi­
cal account of history proposed by Kant; but, according to Hegel, it is funda­
mentally flawed, not least because, although purporting to deal with history, it 
actually leaves the phenomenon of history completely aside. Kant wishes to 
explain or render significant the course of history understood as a whole, but 
in order to do this, he appeals to a criterion which stands outside history. That 
is, Kant's contribution to the idea of history is that he characterizes it as se­
cretly guided by nature, and not by anything that could be considered as intrin­
sic to the historical process. The reason for this, of course, is because Kant 
does not want to give the historical process any kind of independent ontologi­
cal status. Hence his hypothetical call to nature as a condition for rendering it 
intelligible. 
Hegel rejects this approach precisely because it fails to account for the 
philosophical significance of the historical process, i.e., it introduces an exter­
nal criterion for judging this process. For Hegel, who wants to understand his­
tory as having philosophical consequences, it is therefore important to show 
that the historical record exhibits, not a secret "plan of nature" but the "cun­
ning of reason." The criterion by means of which the historical process is to be 
judged must be seen as arising out of the historical process itself, and must 
belong to that process. It cannot be imported from without, nor can it simply 
be assumed. It has to be real if it is to be effective. 
Thus, according to Hegel, Kant's intentions were good, and his insight 
into the purpose of a philosophy of history was right, insofar as he saw it as 
bringing some sense into the otherwise pretty dismal spectacle of human 
history, and Kant did this with the Enlightenment's conviction that the future 
promised more good than the past. The point Hegel makes, and here he 
shows his superior understanding of the very idea of history, is that we cannot 
bring sense to history, we can only discern it. What Kant and the Enlighten­
ment failed to understand was that by definition only the future can "promise" 
the possibility of a better world. However, only the past is capable of reveal­
ing what the world has so far achieved. 
Thus, the ideas of a "cunning of nature" and the "cunning of reason" are 
in fact radically different. When Hegel says that reason displays "cunning" in 
achieving its end, he means that this is something that goes on within the his­
torical process. 
However, because to say that the realization of the ends of reason is 
intrinsic to the historical process is still not to say whose ends we are talking 
about (at least not unambiguously), we are not out of the woods yet. Kant, for 
his part, made this point abundantly clear: The ends to be realized in history 
are not those of any particular human being but those of the human race. 
Hegel talks about the ends of reason, but surely to say the ends of reason are 
working themselves out in history is a somewhat poetic way of saying some­
thing else. What indeed does it mean to say that history is the self-actualiza­
tion of Absolute Spirit? In order to get clear about this, we will have to tum to 
Hegel's Logic where he mentions this notion of the "cunning of reason" in the 
section he devotes to the conceptual elaboration of the notion of "Teleology." 
,1.J."L.,,,,~i,,,., .. ,.,j ~ ,., ••• ,.1 .•• i, ....,,," ,',,~.. I, ...,"L'., ....:.L(.li: ... L_,.",'.'_ 
. :" ..•.... ~..,."..• ~ ....,~"_,-:. ...,.J:".~.'~~.,,.tM,. ,J,,''t·!; n - ... 
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As we are concerned with the "ends" of reason, the notion of "teleo­
logy" is clearly relevant. However, let it be noted that the discussion Hegel 
provides in this section is meant to provide a clue - but only a clue - to 
understanding what he means by the "ends"of reason. 
What does Hegel mean by the concept of "teleology"? First of all, 
where is it placed in his Logic? It follows the sections on "Mechanism" and 
"Chemism" which are the main categories that deal with the external world, or 
nature. It not only follows these sections but also completes the general treat­
ment of "Objectivity"and thus leads to the final section of the Doctrine of the 
Concept, which deals with the Idea. This is why, of course, this section only 
provides a clue to what Hegel is trying to demonstrate. For as far as Hegel is 
concerned the concept of teleology is a progressively more adequate but not 
yet complete characterization of the Concept or Idea. This is helpful to some, 
gibberish to others. Of course, what most of us mean by teleology is explana­
tion by reference to an end. For example, to describe a particular activity as 
"goal-directed" is to give a "teleological" characterization of that activity 
insofar as any complete explanation will have to make explicit reference to 
the goal of the activity; i.e., something which lies at the end of the process but 
which still is understood is the guiding factor throughout the process. Another 
concept which is connected with the teleological approach to explaining phe­
nomena is that of purpose; l.e., something is explained teleologically when we 
show how it serves as the means toward a particular purpose or end. This par­
ticular characterization is in many ways responsible for the bad name teleolo­
gical explanation has, especially in the natural sciences. Hegel gives an exam­
ple of the misuse of "teleological" explanation ''when not only the vine is con­
sidered under the aspect of the well-known utility that it has for men, but the 
cork-tree too is considered in its relation to the stoppers cut from its bark in 
order to seal the wine-bottles." Such misuse, however, in no way reflects the 
actual richness of the concept of teleology. What we must do is draw a distinc­
tion between external and internalpurposiveness. That is, the relation that te­
leology describes is one in which the purpose or end is externally related to the 
means. A sense of teleology, in which the end has an internal relation to the 
means, had been brought out by Kant, but it was already present in Aristotle, 
and according to Hegel, it clearly "stands infinitely far above the concept of 
modem teleology which had only finite, or external purposiveness in view" 
(EL, § 204, Remark). However, the modem characterization of teleology 
holds that "things are held not to bear their determination within themselves, 
but to count merely as means, which are used up in the realization of a pur­
pose that lies outside of them" (EL, §205, Addition). Now, having mentioned 
this, I will be the first to admit that it sounds an awful lot like what Hegel 
wrote about the "cunning of reason" in the passage from the Philosophy ofHis­
tory quoted at the beginning of this paper. Remember that there the cunning 
of reason "sets the passions to work in its service, so the agents by which it 
gives itself existence must pay the penalty and suffer the loss." But Hegel, in 
this section on "Teleology,"wants to show that an external approach, while it 
certainly has proven to be useful on occasion, "does not suffice for a genuine 
insight into the nature of things" (EL, §205, Addition). What is needed is an 
internal approach. But how are we to reconcile this requirement with the ap­
6. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, trans, by Theodore Gereats, H. S. Harris, and 
W. A. Sucllting (forthcomiDg), § 205, Addition; hereafter cited as 'U'. 
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parent expendibility of particular human lives associated with the idea of the 
"cunning of reason"? Perhaps the beginning of an answer may be discerned in 
such remarks as the following: "Certainly finite things as such must be given 
their due by being regarded as not ultimate and as pointing beyond them­
selves. But this negativity of finite things is their own dialectic, and if we are to 
(re)cognize this, we must involve ourselves first of all in their positive content" 
(EL, §205, Addition; my emphasis). This passage is important, not only for 
understanding the concept of teleology, but for understanding what Hegel 
takes the historical process to be. Perhaps this can best be illustrated by com­
paring, once again, Hegel's conception of the "cunning of reason" with Kant's 
conception of the "cunning of nature." For Hegel, the "negativity of finite 
things" serves, as it does for Kant, to bring about the ultimate end. This end, 
however, for Kant is infinitely far removed, i.e., unattainable, whereas for 
Hegel this end must be in some way implicit, because for Hegel this negativity 
is dialectical. It is through this process of negating human lives (which is one 
way of looking at the historical process, one which drove Kant to postulate the 
hypothetical "secret design of nature") that the end is made explicit. Thus, for 
Hegel, the "end" is not in some infmitely distant beyond, but is already present 
in the "positive content" of any given finitude. The "story" of history is not a 
postulated story whose moral is meant to be put into practice, as it is for Kant, 
but the "story" of what has actually already taken place. The "cunning of 
reason" lies in the fact that it has not only survived the spoils of time, but 
actually realized itself progressively as well. 
Perhaps a good way to show how the notion of teleology illustrates this 
idea of the cunning of reason is to follow d'Hondt's suggestion to distinguish 
between two senses of this "cunning": first the "cunning of human beings" in 
the face of natural forces; then the "cunning of reason" per se, which finds 
itself "faced" with human passions (which can also be understood as natural 
forces, but which prove to be the motor of history)," As stated above, teleo­
logy is concerned with the relations between means and end insofar as the 
end itself is understood in terms of purpose. To consider first the "cunning of 
human beings," the concern is therefore with human purposes. Human beings 
are a part of nature, that is, we are finite, and like any other finite things we 
are subject to particular constraints and limitations. For example, human be­
ings have to contend with a variety of natural forces, some found outside our­
selves (like the weather), others found within ourselves (like hunger). We can 
succeed in these contentions in a variety of ways. The cunning of human be­
ings consists in our ability to use natural forces in such ways that we can make 
them do what we want, while we simply sit back and enjoy the results. We can 
harness natural processes by means of a variety of devices so that we do not 
have to exert ourselves with mind-numbing, back-breaking activities. H human 
beings had not invented the windmill, we would still have to exhaust ourselves 
turning the wheel on our own. Thus, while still subject to those natural forces, 
by means of our cunning, we humans can "tum" those natural forces to our 
own advantage. Humans, the rational animals, although only a relatively small 
part of the world, can by the use of our reason make the forces of the world 
7. Jacques d'Hondt, '7tlfologie et Praxis dans la Logique de Hegel," in Hegel et III 
pens~e ~, ed. by Jacques d'Hondt (Paris: Presses universitaires de FrlUlCC, 1970), p. 23. 
He discusses the same idea in his Hege~ philosophe de l'histoire viwInIe (paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1987), p. 337. 
~_. _"~'"'''''~''''''',~~-.._,,, 
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work/or us, indeed, even protect us from their very magnitude. In the Science 
0/Logic,Hegel expresses it this way: 
The finitude of rationality has ... this side, that the end enters 
into relationship with the presupposition, that is, with the exter­
nality of the object. In the immediate relation to the object, it 
would itself enter into the sphere of mechanism or chemism 
and thereby by subject to contingency and the loss of its deter­
mination as the Notion that is in and for itself. But as it is, it 
puts forward an object as means, allows it to wear itself out in 
its stead, exposes it to attrition and shields itself behind it from 
mechanical violence," 
We may grant, and even to some extent admire, human "cunning" in 
our dealings with nature, but it will not do to leave things at that. This would 
be to approach our dealings with nature merely externally, as though our pur­
poses in dealing with nature were predetermined and unalterable. This would 
be to understand humankind as a closed and finished product. However, the 
whole point of the discussion is to show that such a conception is mistaken, 
insofar as a curious and highly revealing particularity of human beings is that 
they may use different means in order to achieve different ends; and because 
the relation of human beings to nature is internal, the means themselves 
reverberate back on the ends sought. The result is that it is often the case that 
the means themselves turn out to be of more worth than the ends for which 
they were devised. Hegel points out that "the plough is more honourable than 
are immediately the enjoyments procured by it and which are ends. The tool 
lasts, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his 
tools man possesses power over external nature, even though in respect of his 
ends he is, on the contrary, subject to it" (SL, p. 747). 
What we are witnessing here, of course, is what might be called the 
transition from the "cunning of human beings" to the "cunning of reason." For 
us humans, satisfying our desires and needs actually produces instruments 
which, withoutour having intended thisresult, tum around to shape and refine 
those desires and needs. (Indeed, consumer society provides an - alas! ­
perfect illustration of this process.) It is in this sense that the products of what 
we call "civilization"i.e., art, religion, science, which ultimately stem from our 
finite strivings, tum around to shape and direct those strivings toward ends 
which are themselves not finite. This is the sense of the "cunning of reason" 
which Hegel is talking about in, for example, EL, § 209, Addition: 
Reason is as cunning as it is mighty. Its cunning generally 
consists in the mediating activity which, while it lets objects act 
upon one another according to their own nature, and wear each 
other out, brings only its own purpose to execution without itself 
mingling in the process. In this sense we can say that with 
regard to the world and its process, divine Providence behaves 
with absolute cunning. God lets men, who have their particular 
passions and desires, do as they please, and what results is the 
• 8. G. W. F. Hegel, TfIe S~ ofLogic, trans. by A. V. Miller (New York: Humani­
nes, 1969), p. 743; hereafter citedas SL. 
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accomplishment of his intentions, which are something other 
than those whom he uses were directly concerned about. 
Hegel here uses, as he often does, the idea of divine Providence as an 
illustration or a pointer to the idea he is trying to develop (understandably, be­
cause religion for Hegel communicates by means of representational images). 
Or, put otherwise, Hegel recognizes the insight contained in the religious con­
ception of divine Providence and is trying to render this insight explicit. For 
the religious person (who believes in divine Providence) what, I suspect, is 
being expressed in this idea is the belief that the true or good ends of all 
human life are embodied in God, and that even despite one's creaturely (i.e., 
finite or "fallen") status, one is, through God's grace, directed toward those 
true and proper ends. Hegel recognizes the truth contained in this religious 
framework and seeks to explicate it philosophically. Thus, for Hegel, the true 
and proper ends of human life are the product and expression of reason. 
What reason? Whose reason? Absolute Reason, Infinite Reason, that Reason 
which no finite being possesses but in which all finite human beings partake. 
Of course, all of this is not immediately apparent from the perspective of a 
finite being. Tell people that the source and end of human life is Reason, and 
they will scoff at you. They will tell you that they do not know what the source 
of human life is, and that the only end they know is that of survival. Indeed, it 
would not be unreasonable for them to say this. On the contrary, it is a posi­
tion that has been developed and defended precisely in the name of human 
rationality. However, a few moments reflection will show that this (finite) 
position is far from adequate. (What follows here also serves to show the ulti­
mate inadequacy of the concept of "teleology.") Because, obviously, survival 
cannot, in the end, be the goal of life, given that the achievement of that goal 
or end is doomed to failure, simply because we are mortal. Survival in this 
world is not our true end, for we are born to this world and must die to this 
world. Or, in rather less oratorical words, the idea of survival is an abstract 
and unattainable ideal; one that does not arise out of the process but is 
posited abstractly as an unattainable end. However, having said that, we must 
recognize that, as the old saying goes, each of us must die our own death, and 
as long as we are alive, we do in fact "survive."This is where the "cunning of 
reason" demonstrates just how cunning it is. While each of us is busy surviving, 
busy "making a life" for ourselves (and consequently unrelentingly moving 
toward our inevitable death), what we are actually doing is sustaining and 
continuing and developing the life of Reason. We die, but Reason lives on 
through our accomplishments, whether large or small. Because, after all, if.we 
"survive" at all, both as a species and as individuals, it is by the strength of our 
wits, by our use of Reason. Moreover, that which we produce by Reason re­
turns to Reason after we are gone, to be taken up by others. 
This is the true and proper end of human life, the production and re­
turn of Reason upon itself. The Purpose of Reason is its own self-production 
or self-actualization, as Hegel writes inEL, § 212, Addition: 
In the sphere of the finite we can neither experience nor see
 
that the Purpose is genuinely attained. The accomplishing of
 
the infinite Purpose consists therefore only in sublating the illu­

sion that it has not yet been accomplished. The Good - the ab­
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solute Good - fulfils itself eternally in the world, and the result 
is that it is already fulfilled in and for itself, and does not need 
to wait upon us for this to happen. This is the illusion in which 
we live, and at the same time it is this illusion alone that is the 
activation uponwhich our interest in the world rests. 
It is here, perhaps, that we have the strongest and most poignant expression of 
why Reason must use all of its cunning to actualize itself in the world; in other 
words, in order to survive. For although Hegel writes that the absolute Good 
"does not need to wait upon us" in order to fulfil itself, this is not to say that 
the absolute Good can be accomplished without us. He simply recognizes 
what all of us recognize in our more lucid moments: We would be "absolute 
fools" to proclaim arrogantly for ourselves the achievement of the absolute 
Good. History has shown all too often that those who have made this claim 
have been dismally and tragically wrong. However, Hegel's genius consists in 
showing us that even despite this, the absolute Good remains the ultimate 
reality we seek even despite ourselves. The Good does not ''wait upon us" be­
cause it cannot exist outside of us, but rather must pass through us in order to 
accomplish itself. It posits itself through our constant striving toward a better 
life, and thereby is itself the object of that striving. It is in this sense that the 
Absolute is both the subject and the object of human life. It is also in this 
sense that what would otherwise appear as the futility of human striving takes 
on the character and distinction of absolute worth: the means by which the 
Good is actualized in the world. 
I could conceivably stop here but I fear that (on the condition of hav­
ing been successful) I will have provided an interesting argument only to those 
already seduced by Hegel's vision. Of course, this is not a bad thing in itself. 
However, part of the task I have assigned myself in this paper is to show that 
Hegel does have something to say to those who wish to deny any reference to 
any Absolute, Hegelian or other, in the name of the free, conscious, and fully 
responsible nature of human action in the world. Indeed, part of my claim is 
that this is an essential feature of Hegel's position. If this has not become ob­
vious it is because, in explicating the notion of the "cunning of reason," I have 
put the emphasis on the intelligibility of such a notion as the self-actualization 
of Reason in the world through the accomplishments and products of human 
life. In other words, it might appear that I am more concerned with Reason 
than I am with human life. This is understandable but wrong. So what I must 
show now is not so much how human beings are duped into contributing to the 
self-actualization of Reason, but how they actually do, make that contribution. 
Hegel is often accused of quietism. Indeed such a charge is to be ex­
pected, given, for example, the claim Hegel makes (discussed above) about 
how the Good is eternally accomplishing itself in the world. This kind of talk 
has led a recent critic to claim that Hegel has taken the Leibnizian idea of the 
"best of all possible worlds" to its greatest heights by taking away responsi­
bility from individual human beings and giving it to Reason. Thus, according 
to this critic, Hegel becomes one of the great apologists of modem individu­
alism, because it is by their full self-preoccupation with their private worlds 
that individuals assure themselves of the self-development of the public good," 
However interesting, such a reading is inaccurate, of course, because what the 
9. Alain Renaut, L'be de l'individu (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), pp. 201-210. 
I...._~~_ , ~--_..~ " 
REALIZING REASON 87 
idea of the "cunning of reason" has shown is that is precisely by means of 
responsible human actions that Reason actualizes itself. 
In order to clarify this, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves that 
Hegel is not prescribing the course of history but describing its accomplish­
ment. History, as any historian will tell you, has nothing to do with prescrip­
tion and prediction. This is an important point, insofar as the misunderstand­
ing of Hegel here is characteristic of a wider misunderstanding of the peculiar 
nature of history as such, that is, of what it is that makes the historical process 
specifically historical. 
O'Brien, in his excellent book on Hegel's philosophy of history, draws 
our attention to this fact: "Despite the lack of explicit reference to the under­
standing in Reasonin History, it is essential that we realize that the doctrine of 
reason in history is implicitly set against what [Hegel] is rejecting: a doctrine 
of understanding in history."IO The understanding, which deals with abstract 
universals, is thereby ill-equipped to deal with the concrete "events" of history, 
i.e., the doings and sufferings of human beings. All of this suggests that in our 
discussion so far we have concentrated too much on the end or result of his­
tory and not enough on the process of history. What we have to do is show that 
the process is in fact what the end or result is all about. But before we do that, 
let us see, in Hegel's words, precisely what this result has been: 
What is null and vanishing consitutes only the surface of the 
world, not its genuine essence. Thisessence is the Concept that 
is in and for itself, and so the world is itself the Idea. The 
unsatisfied striving vanishes when we (re)cognize that the final 
purpose of the world is just as much accomplished as it is eter­
nally accomplishing itself. This is in general the outlook of the 
mature person, whereas youth believes that the world is in an 
utterly sorry state, and that something quite different must be 
made of it. On the other hand, the religious consciousness re­
gards the world as governed by divine Providence and hence as 
corresponding to what it ought to be. This agreement between 
is and ought is not rigid and unmoving, however, since the final 
purpose of the world, the Good, only is, because it constantly 
brings itself about; and there is still this distinction between the 
spiritual and the natural worlds: that, whilst the latter continues 
simply to return into itself, there is certainly a progression 
taking place in the former as well. (EL, § 234, Addition) 
It is within this context that Hegel's (in)famous claim that what is 
rational is real, what is real is rational, must be understood. As Hegel says 
above, the "agreement between is and ought is not rigid and unmoving." How 
can it be? It is the continuing process of the world as it progressively unfolds 
itself. This process is synonymous with human history. 
With this shift in perspective - away from Reason as a result, to hu­
man history as a process, even though these are simply two ways of expressing 
the same reality - we will be in a better position to respond to those who are 
concerned with the "dignity" of the individual's struggle for free and responsi­
10. G~ DeunisO'Brien, Hegel on Reason and KlStory:A Contemponuy Interpmll­
lion (Chicago: UDiVcnity of Chicago Press, 1975),p, 72. . 
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ble existence. For it is clear that the major objection to Hegel's grand vision 
of reality is that it seems to leave precious little room for the individual free­
dom each of us claims to exercise. I think I have presented enough evidence 
to show that Hegel does not hold a "puppet-show" view of human existence. 
On the contrary, if it were not for human accomplishments Reason itself 
would not exist. What we want to know now, however, is what role individual 
freedom has to play in Hegel's grand scheme. 
The short answer is, of course: everything. For if human beings were 
not free to do whatever they wanted, why would Reason have to exercise cun­
ning in order to get them to do what it wants? As we have seen, what Reason 
wants is what human beings ultimately want even though they, for the most 
part, do not realize this - that is, not until they stop and reflect on what it is 
they are doing. In fact, this is precisely what Hegel's whole philosophy pro­
poses to do: to stopand reflecton whatit is weare doing. Then, and only then, 
will we be in a position to recognize that what we have been doing all along is 
realizing reason inhistory. We do this through our concrete actions. 
What, then, is the structure of these actions that we as human beings 
undertake? First of all, our actions always take place within a determinate 
context. While this context limits what we are capable of undertaking, it still 
does not tell us what to undertake. Herein lies the sphere of freedom. It is 
important to point out that freedom is primarily something we exercise, not 
primarily something we possess. Thus, free action consists in a self-determined 
response within a specific "context" (understood as an articulated - or to-be­
articulated - set of parameters of relevance). Hegel calls this "context" 
actuality. Our actions all take place within an actual world. What we are faced 
with in the actual world are concrete possibilities. Which are we to choose? 
The fact that these possibilities must be mediated through concrete human 
choice is what effectively establishes this claim to freedom. 
All of this is fairly straightforward. However, what we want to do is 
understand how our freedom actually works within this framework. Hegel 
does this by considering the logical categories that make it up. They are, as we 
have seen, actuality and possibility; but we must also consider necessity and 
contingency. A complete examination of these categories is obviously beyond 
the scope of this paper. We will restrict ourselves to considering them in 
relation to human action. 
The context within which human action takes place is, as mentioned 
above, actuality. The first thing Hegel warns us about is "the confusion of actu­
ality with what is tangible and immediately perceptible" (EL, § 142, Addition). 
This is appearance, of course, and not true actuality. Paul Owen Johnson, in a 
recent commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic, elaborates: "The actual is the 
inner which has externalized itself, the potency which has actualized itself, the 
essence which exists, or has appeared. It is therefore not to be confused with 
mere external existence, or what is commonly called reality."! The- actual is 
that which springs out of the undifferentiated world of possibility. That is, the 
actual world is a particular configuration of possibility as actual. Thus, possibi­
lity gives rise to actuality. So far so good. However, as Hegel points out, if it 
11. Paul Owen Jolmson, The Critiqueo/Thought:A Re-examination 0/Hegel's ·Science 
ofLogic" (Avebury: Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., 1988), p. 139. 
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were not for actuality, possibility would never come to be. 12 This is where hu­
man action comes in. It actualizes possibility. But not just any possibility: the 
possibilities implicit within any given actuality. This is why actuality is a more 
concrete category than possibility, for, Hegel tells, "it contains possibility with­
in itself as an abstract moment" (EL, § 143, Addition). Not all possibilities can 
be possible at a given time because otherwise possibility would never be able 
to give rise to actuality. Because actuality is more concrete than possibility ­
because it is actual - we can discern which possibilities have been effectively 
actualized. This is the task of concrete human action: to concretely actualize 
the implicit possibilities of the world. All this seems pretty reasonable. How­
ever, it is the next (logical) step which causes all the problems, so we will have 
to look at it carefully. Hegel maintains that the relation between possibility 
and actuality leads to the next logical category because: "Whether this or that 
is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the totality of 
moments of Actuality, an Actuality which, in the unfolding of its moments, 
proves to be Necessity" (EL, § 143,Addition). 
At this point, one may want to object that since we are here concerned 
with human action, we will only be misled if we follow Hegel on his "logical" 
meanderings. There is obviously much truth to the idea that the exercise of 
freedom is, in a sense, "determined" by the context in which it finds itself. But 
this does not mean that "determination" here carries the sense of "necessity." 
However, in defense of Hegel, it should be emphasized that the refer­
ence to "necessity" is not to a formal or abstract necessity but, if one may put 
it this way, a concrete necessity. What this means is that we must try to con­
ceive of necessity within the concrete world of actuality as actualized possibi­
lity. What Hegel is trying to show is that actuality is made up of realized or 
determinate possibilities, and that the possibilities which end up "making it" 
into actuality are to be seen as, in an important sense, necessary; necessary be­
cause those possibilities are the only possible ones, given the structured cha­
racteristics of particular circumstances, or "context". Thus, the answer to the 
question asked above about which concrete possibilities are we to choose, are 
the only ones we discern can be effectively actualized. Actualized possibility is 
real possibility. As Hegel writes in SL, p. 549: 
What is necessary cannot be otherwise; but what is simply possi­
ble can; for possibility is the in itself that is only positedness and 
therefore essentially otherness. Formal possibility is this identity 
as transition into a sheer other; but real possibility, because it 
contains the other moment, actuality, is already itself necessity. 
Therefore what is really possible can no longer be otherwise; 
under the particular conditions and circumstances something 
else cannot follow. Real possibility and necessity are therefore 
12. For both the negative and the positive determinations of "possibility" d. John 
Burbidge, "The Necessity of Contingency: An Analysis of Hegel's Chapter on 'Actuality' in the 
Science 0/ Logic" in A1t and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy, ed. by Warren E. Steinkraus and 
Kenneth L. Schmitz (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980). For example: 
"The possible is the ground of the actual. As ground, however, it is not simply other than the 
actual, for it is, implicitly, what the actual is explicitly. This identity of the unplicit and the 
explicit defines the positive sense of possibility, while its distinction from the actual provides its 
negative determination· (p. 2(2). 
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only seemingly different; this is an identity which does not have 
to become but is already presupposed and lies at their base. 
Part of what is being said here is that we should not conceive of neces­
sity as some kind of constraining force, as something fixed and unyielding. 
Nor, of course, should we think of necessity as confined to tautologous propo­
sitions. What we have to do is try to conceive of "necessity" as embodied in the 
actual world. In order to obtain a full picture of the matter we must introduce 
yet another category, namely: contingency. Human action. viewed from the in­
side as it were, is implicitly possibility, insofar as actuality is actualized possibi­
lity. Human action. viewed from the outside, is contingency.P That such-and­
such was done at such-and-such time is a matter of contingent fact, when 
viewed from the outside. To say that the world is as it is as a matter of contin­
gent fact is precisely to view the world from the outside. This, however, is not 
the point of view of human action. Human action, that is, effective human 
action. deals with the world as it is, i.e., as actual, as actualized possibility. It 
cannot deal with "mere" possibilities or be overly concerned with the multiple 
contingencies that surround it (I have to finish this paper, and it does not 
matter if my socks are brown or blue or both). Human action must deal with 
the concrete world and its exigencies. It must deal only with those possibilities 
which are "necessary" (really or effectively possible) in order to actualize that 
which it seeks to achieve. As we have seen, what is meant by "necessary" here 
is that which exhibits real possibility or, what amounts to the same thing, 
actuality," This is precisely what human action seeks to achieve. Insofar as it 
is rational, it seeks to achieve the possibilities implicit within the actual or, in 
other words, to actualize the implicit possibilities within the given actuality, 
which, because it contains those unactualized possibilities, is not yet fully ac­
tual. This is the movement of actuality, which is the movement of human acti­
vity, which is history. In what sense can this movement be called necessary? In 
the sense that actuality negates mere possibility by determining and realizing 
what can only be characterized as real possibility, and real possibility is 
nothing other than "necessity," that is, those possibilities effectively realized in 
the course of time. (Some such notion is implicit in the expression that a 
decision or policy is "moving in the direction" of history. What is meant is, not 
moving toward a predetermined end, even if ultimately unattainable, but as 
effectively responding to current exigencies.) 
But could not it still be argued that, on this account, action is limited 
and determined to bring about real possibility and nothing else, such that 
calling human action "free" in this case is limiting it to the acceptance of the 
world as it is? If this is the movement of history, how can we avoid seeing it as, 
at bottom, a blind process in which our actions can be said to be our own only 
in the sense that we are the unwitting agents of that process? 
Hegel recognizes that necessity is often understood as "blind" and he 
says that "this is quite right, in as much as Purpose is still not present explicitly 
as such in the process of necessity" (EL, § 147, Addition). As we all know, hu­
man activity is purposive activity, and thus "if we consider purposive activity, 
13. For the inside-outside metaphor, d. Robin G. COllingwood, The Ide" of History 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1946),pp. 113-122. 
14. As Burbidge remarks (p. 208): "Refledion on real possibility shows that it is not 
possible to be both a rem possibility of an actuality, and yet be distinct from that actuality as 
possibility•• 
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then the content is a purpose of which we knew beforehand, so that the acti­
vity is not blind but sighted" (EL, § 147, Addition). So, what Hegel is actually 
saying is that, if we view actuality as the product of human activity, we can see 
that implicit within a necessary process (the continuous collapse and rearticu­
lation of reality) is a process which must be understood as suffused with pur­
pose. Thus, the supposed blind necessity of the historical process as outlined 
above will be overcome if, and only if, that process becomes self-conscious. 
Only, that is, if human beings take the responsibility of their own actions into 
their own hands and try to see what possibilities are contained in the actual 
world in which they find themselves. 
Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not comprehended, and 
hence there is nothing more absurd than the reproach of blind 
fatalism that is levelled against the Philosophy of History 
because it regards the cognition of the necessity of what has 
happenedas itspropertask. In this perspective, the philosophy of 
History takes on the significance of a theodicy; and those who 
think to honour divine Providence by excluding necessity from 
it, actually degrade Providence by this abstraction to the level of 
blind, irrational arbitrariness. (EL, § 147, Addition; emphasis 
added) 
Of course, this "cognition" of necessity is nothing other than the re­
cognition of the cunning of Reason which, in the face of what seem like 
insurmountable odds (i.e., the greed, stupidity, and pettiness of human beings; 
awesome natural forces, etc.), still manages to come out on top, insofar as 
action is still possible in this world. There are still implicit possibilities waiting 
to be actualized by those who have the "cunning" to recognize them. Only 
those who actually see themselves as embodying these possibilities will in fact 
be able to actualize them. 
Thus the fear of those who think that Hegel takes away all responsibi­
lity and freedom from individuals is ill-founded. Indeed, the whole project of 
the philosophy of history, of the idea of the "cunning of reason" is aimed at 
showing that no matter how desperate or absurd or meaningless the world can 
appear at times, it remains a world in which responsible and free action can. 
does, and must take place, as long as there are human beings around to 
undertake it. Our freedom lies not in our ability to do whatever we want, 
whenever we want. If that were the case, it would not be long before we were 
smitten by forces we would be incapable of recognizing. No, our freedom lies 
in the fact that we have the capacity to recognize and understand what we do, 
and thus to guide and attune our actions to and within a world in which we 
continuously discover ourselves to be participating. So, what the doctrine of 
the "cunning of reason" does is not to deny human freedom, but to affirm it by 
enabling us to understand that "when we recognize that whatever happens to 
us is only an evolution of our own selves, and that we carryonly the burden of 
our own debts, we behave as free men, and whatever may befall us, we keep 
the firm faith that nothing unjust can happen to us" (EL, § 147, Addition). 
This reference to "faith" reminds me of something Collingwood once 
wrote. He tells that human rationality (which he insists is by no means a 
given) depends on the belief in two simple articles of faith. The first is 
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theoretical and consists simply in believing that the universe as a whole is 
rational, intelligible, meaningful. The second is practical: 
[It] consists in the certainty that life is worth living, that the 
world in which we have been unwillingly thrust is a world that 
contains scope for action and will give a fair chance of showing 
what we are made of; a world in which, if we tum out to be 
complete failures, we should have only ourselves to blame. 
Practical faith means "accepting the universe" or, what is the 
same thing, knowing that we are free. 15 
Thus, for all the apparent abstractness that the concept of an "Absolute 
Idea" has at first glance, its use is an attempt to reconcile us to the world. Not 
in the sense of abandoning us to its mysterious forces, nor by reducing us to a 
rational but mechanical principle. Rather, the point is we do have a place 
within the world, and it is a self-conscious place, won by the collective effort 
which sustains and enhances the recognition of that place as far as we have 
been able and willing. This is not an easy task in the best of times. The genius 
- and dare I say cunning - of Hegel has been to show us that, even in the 
worst of times, the very possibility of our self-consciousness serves as a 
guarantee that our place in the world is secured. Perhaps the task of the philo­
sopher is precisely to help keep that possibility alive. 
University of Ottawa 
, : 15. Robin G. ColliDgwood, FaiJh I11fd Reason, (Chicago: Quadrangle, 19(7), p. 141. 
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Hegelian/Whiteheadian Perspectives. By Darrel E. Christensen. 
Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1989. Pp, xxx + 
338. $28.75 cloth; $17.25 pbk. ISBN 0-8191-7078-X cloth; 0-8191­
7079-8 pbk. 
This collection of fifteen philosophical essays, principally prepared be­
tween 1974 and 1987, is an indispensable complement to Darrel E. Christen­
sen's major work on the Hegel-Whitehead relation, The Search for Concrete­
ness: Reflections on Hegel and Whitehead (hereafter 'SC), which appeared 
only two years earlier (cf. George Lucas' review in The Owl, 20, 2 [Spring 
1989]: 210-216). The problematic of the earlier work was predominantly 
"methodological," the intent having been to outline an authentically "critical" 
approach to fundamental issues of epistemology and metaphysics from a 
"somewhat Hegelian perspective." The present work, building out from SC, is 
mainly devoted to a historical "dialogue" between his original Hegel appropri­
ation and reconstruction and some representative streams of contemporary 
philosophy. This is on the basis of his assumption, shared by the reviewer, that 
today's most helpful contribution to Hegelianism can no longer consist in en­
tanglements in "potentially endless interpretative debate of a sort that would 
be found of interest only to a few specialists," so much as in bringing out 
"something of the import of Hegel's work" "in confrontation with competing 
philosophical orientations" (p. xviii). Such a confrontation cannot, of course, 
be fruitful apart from having previously made clear what aspects or tenets of 
Hegel's philosophy are being appropriated. This clearly presupposes the deve­
lopment of a consistent Hegel interpretation (although not of that excessively 
narrow philological sort of which Christensen is rightfully critical), to which 
especially the preface along with Essays I and XI offer an invaluable con­
tribution. In the last two parts of the work (Essays IX-XV) he presents his 
readers with a somewhat detailed account of his position with respect to much 
debated issues in contemporary thought such as the "philosophy of language" 
and "cultural relativity." This seems to me to be very likely the most original 
and up-to-date contribution to philosophy to be found in all of his philosophi­
cal work. In fact, as I shall presently show, although never departing from a 
close commitment to Hegelian principles, his reflections on these subjects 
seem to go a little, at least, toward justifying his claim to have advanced "first 
philosophy" somewhat "beyond" Hegel (cf. p. xi). 
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